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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HAL E. HOLMSTEAD,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC.,

Case No.
12,257

Defendant-Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for damages for personal injuries
caused by the negligence of defendant's agent.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court denied defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, this Court granted defendant's Petition for Intermediate Appeal. This
Court, by its opinion of January 25, 1972, reversed the
judgment of the trial court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent now seeks a rehearing on the grounds
that: 1) The Court did not consider important new
cases on the question of covenants not to sue as releasing a principle. (2) The Court's decision is contrary to
proper rules of contract construction. ( 3) The Court
misconstrued the function of a covenant not to sue.
( 4) The Court's decision will proliferate additional lawsuits. ( 5) The Court's application of respondeat superior defeats the purpose and policy underlying repondeat
superior.
STATEMENT OF FAC'fS
This suit arises out of an accident which occurred
December 6, 1968, at the intersection of Lehi Main
Street and the frontage road to I-15 near Lehi in Utah
County, Utah. A vehicle owned and driven by plaintiff
collided with a vehicle driven by one Gideon Allen. At
the time and place of the accident, Gideon Allen was an
agent and employee of the defendant, Abbott G. M.
Diesel, Inc., operating said vehicle and acting within
the scope of his employment. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks
to hold defendant liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
Suit was commenced by filing of the Complaint on
April 17, 1969, and Summons was served April 18, 1969.
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The employee -Gideon Allen was not and has not been
named as a party to this action.
On July 7, 1969 in consideration of the payment
in behalf of said Gideon Allen of $10,000, plaintiff executed and delivered a simple covenant uot to sue in
which he did "covenant aqd agree never to make any
demand or claim, or commence or cause or permit to be
prosecuted any action at law or in equity, or any proceeding of any description, against Gideon Allen because of personal injury, disability, property damage,
loss of services, expense or loss of any kind ..• sustained
. . . in consequence of an accident that occurred on or
abput the 6th day of December, 1968, at or near Lehi,
Utah." By mutual mistake a reservation of rights
against the defendant. Abbott G. M. Diesel was not
written into the covenant. The covenant was reformed
to include that reservation.
On October 29, 1970, Abbott G. l\f. Diesel, Inc.,
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the
pleadings, depositions and records on file and an affidavit of Reed L. Martineau. Both parties filed written
memorandums in support of their respective positions,
and on September 18, 1970, District Judge, Joseph E.
Nelson denied the motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant thereupon filed its petition for intermediate
appeal which was granted January 8, 1971. On January
25, 1972, this Court handed down its decision reversing
the denial of defendant's motion for Summary Judg-
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ment, upon the ground that a covenant not to sue given
an agent must of necessity release the principal from
liability.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY
TO THE BETTER REASONED RULE OF
NEWER AUTHORITIES.
Three cases decided during 1971 are cited to the
Court as evidence of a growing trend in the authorities
which is contrary to the Court's decision in the present
case. These cases were not available to the plaintiff at
the time of writing his brief and, therefore, have not
heretofore been cited to the Court.
The first case is from the Court of Appeals of New
York, Plath v. Justus, (Feb. 17, 1971), 28 N.Y. 2d 16,
268 N.E. 2d 117. In that case the plaintiff's intestate
was killed by being struck by an automobile owned by
the defendant but driven by a third party. Plaintiff
settled with the third party executing a release which
reserved a right of action against defendant. Defendant
claimed that because he was only derivatively liable, a
release of the active tortfeasor also released him. The
Court rejected defendant's argument and held that the
intent of the parties should govern the affect to be
given to the release.
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The case of Mcltlillen v. Klingenamith, 467 SW
2d 193, was decided on May 12, 1971, by the Supreme
Court of Texas. Here a woman was injured in an automobile accident and her injuries were aggravated by
the negligent treament of a physician. The driver of
the automobile was released by an instrument that made
no mention of the physician. The physician argued that
he was not a joint tortfeasor, that he did not act ooncurrently or in concert with the driver and, therefore,
he was only secondarily liable. His secondary liability,
he argued, was released when the original tortfeasor
was released. Reversing its old "unity of release" rule
under which a release of the original tortfeasor would
also release the malpracticing physician, Justice Pope
stated that "a release of a party or parties named or
otherwise specifically identified fully re]eases only the
parties so named or identified, but no others."
The third case, decided March 4, 1971, is Bartholomew v. McCartha, 179 S.E. 2d 912, in which the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated:
"Being untrammeled by the ancient nile which,
in our view tends to stifle settlements, defeat
the intention of parties and extol technicalities,
we adopt the view that the release of one torlfeasor does not release others who wrongfully
contributed to plaintiff's injuries unless this
was the intention of the parties, or unless plaintiff has, in fact, received full compensation
amounting to satisfaction."
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Realizing full· well that the M cCartha case ·deals with
the liability of joint tortfeasors and not with derivative
liability it is cited to the Court as evidence of a trend.
The modem trend is toward giving effect to the intention of the parties in settlement agreements, rather than
allowing those intentions to be frustrated by some common law dogma. While the most recent decisions in the
country are to the effect that a release with a reservation of rights should be construed as a covenant not to
sue so as to protect the injured party's right to a recovery; this Court on the contrary has reached the conclusion that a covenant not to sue with a specific reservatfon should be treated as a general release so as to cut
off the injured party's right to a recovery.

II.
THE COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY
Tb PROPER RULES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION.
A covenant not to sue is a contract and should be
interpreted in accordance with the rule of contract con·
struction that the intention of the parties to the contract
controls its interpretation. As stated in 2 Williston,
Contracts [ 3d ed.] section 338A p. 720:
"The great majority of the later cases, however, hold that an agreement releasing one
joint tortfeasor should be construed in accord-
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ance with the intention of the parti~s and that
if it shows on its face it was not the intention
of the injured party to relinquish his claim
against the other joint tortfeasor, and his claim
has not been fully satisfied, the "release" will
be construed as having the effect of a covenant not to sue regardless of its form."
It is clear from the summary of section 338A that the
author thinks that the intention of the parties should
govern not only in cases of joint torts, but also in cases
where the liability of two parties for an injury is based
upon respondeat superior, and a release or covenant has
been given to one porty.

"In summary then, where two or more persons
are liable for the same injury though their tort
'WflS not joint, the only question when a release
has been given to one, should be: Has the plaintiff obtained full satisfaction, or what he
agreed to accept as such, for his injury?" (em-phasis added) Id. p. 721.
The plaintiff, Hal Holmstead, did not receive full
satisfaction for his injuries. Had he known- that the
$10,000 consideration given for the covenant was to be
his total recovery, he never would have signed the
agreement. By the terms of the covenant he reserved a
right against Abbott G. M. Diesel as part of the consideration for that covenant. The negation of the reserved right varies the terms of the contract materially.
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The contract as so modified by the Court is not supported by a consideration which would have been satisfactory to the plaintiff. Certainly, if Hal Holmstead
gave up his right to seek redress against the defendant,
Abbott G. M. Diesel, he did so unintentionally, and
Dean Prosser says, "a plaintiff should never be com- '
pelled to surrender his cause of action against any ,
wrongdoer unless he has intentionally done so, or unless '
he has received [full satisfaction]". (Prosser, Law of
Torts [3d ed.], section 46, p. 272.)
III.
THE COURT'S DECISION IS BASED
UPON A MISCONCEPTION OF THE FUNCTION OF A COVENANT NOT TO SUE.

In the Court's opinion by Chief Justice Callister
it is stated:
"Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
the liability of the master to a third person for
injuries inflicted by a servant in the course of
his employment and within the scope of his
authority is derivative and secondary, while
that of the servant is primary, and absent any
delict of the master other than through the
servant, the exoneration of the servant removes
the foundation upon which to impute negligence to the master."
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It is respectfully submitted that the Court has erred b.y
implying that a covenant not to sue a servant exonerates
him. It does not exonerate the servant. It is a promise
not to sue and nothing more. It is not a statement that
the servant is without fault. The alleged fault of the
servant remains which, if proved, is imputed to the
master. It is the fualt of the servant which is the basis
or foundation of the master's liability. A covenant not
to sue the servant may relieve him of the burden of paying the injured party, but it does not relieve or exculpate his fa ult.

IV.
THE COURT'S DECISION WHICH PURPORTS TO PREVENT CIRCUITOUS ACTIONS AND REDUCE LITIGATION WILL
IN REALITY PROLIFERATE ADDITIONAL
LAWSUITS.
As part of the majority's rationale for holding that
a covenant given the agent releases the principal from
responsibility, the Court outlines the process whereby
the principal, if held liable, is subrogated to the rights
of the injured party and thereafter sues the agent for
indemnification. The Court fears this circuity of action. As a theorectical possibility these circuitous suits
seem problematic, but, when examined in the sunlight
of the real world this imagined evil disappears. In
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reality, the employer will not sue his empk>yee. It is not
he who paid the injured party; it was the liability insurer. Would the insurer then sue the employee? No,
because the employee is a named insured under the policy. How can an insurer sue its insured for paying
that which it has contracted to pay? Certainly, this
"circuity of action" problem is more imagined than real.
But, many suits can be foreseen where some unwary plaintiff gives a covenant not to sue an agent with
a reservation against the principal only to find that his
expressed intent is disregarded in court. The injustice
under this situation is clear. The plaintiff will feel
cheated. No doubt he will seek relief in equity to set
aside a covenant which produced such untoward results
on the grounds of mistake or fraud. The rule as presently expressed by the Court is a trap for the unwary.
The Court's decision will force an injured plaintiff
to prosecute his case against an agent who was willing
to settle. The plaintiff will be unable to settle with the
agent for anything less than a full satisfaction for his
injuries, for to do so under the Court's ruling would
terminate any further rights against the principal. An
agent who has no means to pay for a full satisfaction,
but who could have paid a partial compensation, will
have to be made a party to the action.
The Court's decision in the case, in truth conflicts
with the policy of the law to encourage the out-of-court
settlement of disputes.
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v.
THE COURT'S TECHNICAL APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR DEFEATS THE VERY
P UR P 0 SE AND POLICY UNDERLYING
THAT DOCTRINE.
The doctrine of respondeat ·superior was the invention of courts who wanted to insure that parties unjured by the acts of agents would be adequately compensated by the principal who, for pecuniary gain, had
originally set the agent in motion. The development of
the doctrine is explained quite succintly in Agency and
Partnership a casebook by Seavy, Reuschlein, and Hall
(West Publishing Co., 1962, at p. 30.)
"It may be, as Wigmore said ( 17 Harv.L.Rev.
391, 1894), that at one time the master was not
normally responsible for the uncommanded
acts of his servants. But as early as the first
years of the 18th century, the court in Hern v.
Nichols, (I Salk 289, 1708), imposed liability
upon a merchant for the deceit of his factor,
upon the ground that "there is more reason
that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be the loser than
a stranger." Undoubtedly this thought largely
accounts for the imposition of liability upon a
master. He benefits from the proper acts of
the servants. Because of their activities, he
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acquires the means by which he can pay for
their wrongs; they, on the other hand, are seldom financially responsible. It is not unfair
that, in return for the privilege which the common law gives one to accomplish results
through the aid of other human beings, he
should pay for the harm done by the errors
of judgment and negligence of those who
have created profits for him.
The creation of such terms as "primary and secondary"
liability, "active and passive" negligence, "original and
derivative" responsibility were all for the purpose of
enabling the injured party to have a cause of action
against one who could fairly compensate him; but, this
Court uses these terms to restrict and defeat the injured party's right to an adequate recovery. By accept·
ing what little the agent is able to pay, the injured '
party losses the right to recover against the principal
who is better able to pay. And what is more ironic is
that the loss is attributed to the terms found in the doc·
trine originally established to make the principal liable
and insure full recovery.
CONCLUSION
This Court should adopt the majority and better
reasoned rule enunciated above, and reform its opinion
that a covenant not to sue given an agent releases the
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principal and adopt the view of the Courts heretofore
cited that the intention of the parties should govern the
interpretation of a covenant not to sue.
Plaintiff requests that the Court vacate its judgment handed down January 25, 1972, and return this
case to the District Court for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
Jackson Howard, for:
HOWARD AND LE\-VIS

Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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